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CHAPTER 39, THE FLORIDA JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT:
FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT WITH THE
STROKE OF A PEN
SUE CARTER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Juvenile Court has been in existence since 1911.'
Operating under the well-known doctrine of parens patriae,2 the
juvenile division of the circuit court is currently vested by the leg-
islature with exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings "in
which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or vio-
lation of law."" The court is empowered to retain jurisdiction, "un-
less relinquished by its order, until the child reaches nineteen
years of age."4 During this period, the court has the same power
over the child as it had before the child became an adult.'
The Florida Juvenile Justice Act (the Act)' is bottomed on the
philosophy that both the best interests of the child and of the state
must be considered when determining the fate of juvenile offend-
1. Comment, Juvenile Court: Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and the Florida Waiver
Procedures, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 300, 303 (1974). The field is rich with literature describing
the history of the juvenile court, the procedures involved in adjudicating a child delinquent,
and the consequences of such an adjudication. See generally C. TORCIA, 1 WHARTON'S CRnmu-
NAL PROCEDURE §§ 7-12 (12th ed. 1974); Cohill, The United States Supreme Court and the
Juvenile Courts-An Overview, 9 Duq. L. REv. 573 (1971); Johnson, The Juvenile Court in
Transition, 44 FLA. B.J. 514 (1970); Kapner, The Juvenile's Right to Treatment-the Next
Step, 47 FLA. B.J. 228 (1973); Kaufman, The Child in Trouble: The Long and Difficult
Road to Reforming the Crazy-Quilt Juvenile Justice System, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 743 (1982);
Murray, Family Law, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 561, 585 (1966); Waybright, A Proposed Juvenile
Court Act for Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 16 (1951); 25 FLA. JuR 2D Family Law §§ 225-68
(1981).
2. The concept of parens patriae originated in England where the law recognized a
residual power in the crown to protect children. The earliest cases invoking the doctrine,
however, protected children against wrongdoing adults and not against the child's own mis-
behavior. M. PAULSEN & C. WHrrEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 5 (1974).
3. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(1) (1981). A "child" is defined to be "any unmarried person under
the age of 18 alleged to be dependent or any married or unmarried person who is charged
with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of 18 years."
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(7) (1981). In addition, a "'[c]hild who has committed a delinquent act'
means a child who . . .is found by a court to have committed a felony, a misdemeanor,
contempt of court, or a violation of a local penal ordinance and whose case has not been
prosecuted as an adult case." FLA. STAT. § 39.01(8) (1981).
4. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(4) (1981).
5. Id. The legislature specifically provided, however, that this subsection "shall not be
construed to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by any other court having jurisdiction of
the child if the child, after becoming an adult, commits a violation of law." Id.
6. FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1981). The entire chapter is referred to as the Florida Juvenile
Justice Act. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1) (1981).
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ers. 7 The Act's proclaimed purposes are "[t]o protect society more
effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, whenever
possible, methods of offender rehabilitation '8 and "[t]o assure to
all children brought to the attention of the courts. . . as a result
of their misconduct. . . the care, guidance, and control. . . which
will best serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare
of the child and the best interests of the state."'
A child who is suspected of committing a delinquent act or viola-
tion of Florida law is subject to one of three actions by the state.
He may be formally charged in the juvenile court,10 he may be di-
verted from the system and his case submitted to mediation,1 or
the state may decline to prosecute. 2 In the event that the state
attorney does decide to prosecute, judicial proceedings are initi-
ated by filing a petition alleging the commission of a delinquent
act.'3 From this point forth, the juvenile court process in substan-
tial part mirrors that of the adult criminal court. The juvenile de-
fendant has the right to a judicial determination of the probable
cause against him, the right to counsel at every critical stage of
the proceedings, 5 and the right to be informed of the charges
against him.'6 In addition, the juvenile offender has the right to
present witnesses and evidence in his own behalf, and to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him.17 The juvenile need not
be a witness against or otherwise incriminate himself, 8 nor may
the state use illegally seized evidence against him.'9 Although a ju-
venile offender is not entitled to bail, 0 or to trial by jury,2' the
state is still required to prove every element of each offense
7. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2) (1981).
8. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(a) (1981).
9. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(b) (1981).
10. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(a) (1981).
11. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(b) (1981).
12. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(c) (1981).
13. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(1) (1981); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100.
14. FLA. STAT. § 39.032(2) (1981); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.040(b)(5).
15. FLA. STAT. § 39.071(1) (1981); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290.
16. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110.
17. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(I)(b)(2) (1981).
18. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(b)(3) (1981); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.190(e).
19. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(b)(3) (1981).
20. FLA. STAT. § 39.032(6)(a) (1981) (which states that the decision to release a child
from detention care shall be made by the court).
21. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(b) (1981); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.190(c). See also McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that trial by jury in the adjudicative stage of the
juvenile court is not a constitutional requirement).
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charged beyond a reasonable doubt."2
Although the juvenile court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction
to aetermine whether a child should be adjudicated as a delin-
quent, 3 the legislature realizes that some children are not amena-
ble to juvenile court treatment. Thus four methods have been pro-
vided by which a child may be transferred to the adult criminal
court. Under the "judicial waiver" provision, '24 a child who is four-
teen years of age or older and who is charged with a violation of
Florida law is brought before a juvenile court judge for a due pro-
cess waiver hearing. Based upon considerations such as the child's
age, background, and the nature of the charges against him, the
court must then decide whether to continue to treat the defendant
as a juvenile or to certify and transfer him to the criminal justice
system to be charged and tried as an adult. If the court determines
that adult treatment is appropriate, the child is then bound over
for prosecution, trial and sentencing as an adult criminal
defendant.25
A second means of transferring a child to the adult criminal
court is pursuant to an information filed directly by the state at-
torney.2 6 Unlike the judicial waiver provision, the direct file provi-
sion bypasses the juvenile court system altogether. Instead, the
prosecutor is expressly authorized to charge a sixteen or seventeen-
year-old child with a crirpinal offense "when in his judgment and
discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be con-
sidered or imposed. 27
Another method of transfer to adult court is pursuant to an in-
dictment.23 The state attorney is specifically authorized to submit
to the grand jury for consideration any case involving "[a] child of
any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by
death or by life imprisonment. '29 As in the case of an information,
no due process hearing is required. If, upon completion of its in-
quest, the grand jury determines that there is probable cause to
believe that the accused juvenile committed the alleged offense, an
indictment may be returned against him. The child shall then be
22. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(b)(1) (1981).
23. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(1) (1981).
24. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(a) (1981).
25. Id.
26. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981).
27. Id.
28. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981).
29. Id.
1984]
924 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:921
treated as an adult for all subsequent purposes. 0
Finally, a child may be transferred to the adult criminal court
upon his own motion."1 Under the "demand-waiver" provision, a
child and his parent or guardian may choose to opt out of the juve-
nile court into the adult court system. Although seldom used, this
provision may be advantageous in those cases where the child
seeks release prior to an adjudicatory hearing or where he wishes
to exercise his right to a jury trial. 2 Courts which have considered
the demand-waiver statute have held that transfer pursuant to this
provision is mandatory. However, a child who is transferred upon
his own request may still be treated as a juvenile if subsequently
charged with a new offense.
This comment sets forth the current law pertaining to the trans-
fer of juvenile offenders from the juvenile to the adult court sys-
tem. Its purpose is to examine those provisions of the Florida Ju-
venile Justice Act which provide for transfer by judicial waiver,
information, indictment, and pursuant to the child's request. In so
doing, a concise source of information for the practicing attorney
and for concerned members of the legal community is provided. To
achieve this goal, relevant statutory provisions will be examined
and the latest available case law construing these provisions will be
analyzed. Finally, assuming that the transferred offender is found
guilty of the offense charged, the sentencing alternatives which are
available to the adult court will be examined briefly, and the con-
tinuing interplay between the juvenile and adult court processes
will be highlighted.
II. WAIVER OF JURISDICTION
One of the oldest procedures used to transfer a juvenile to the
adult court system is judicial waiver. By this process, the juvenile
court "relinquishes its original jurisdiction over a child and trans-
fers the case to a court of criminal jurisdiction for prosecution" of
the child as an adult. 3 Not all states statutorily provide for waiver
of jurisdiction or its functional equivalent.s"
30. Id.
31. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(b) (1981).
32. See infra note 36 for cases involving due process rights of juveniles.
33. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JuvENILEs, THE JuvENILE JusTcI SYSTEM 4-1 (1983).
34. Id. at 4-1 to 4-2. Among those states which do not provide for waiver are Arkansas,
Nebraska and New York. In Arkansas, if the juvenile is subjected to a warrantless arrest,
the decision to handle the case as a juvenile or criminal case is made by the prosecutor. If,
however, the child is arrested pursuant to a warrant, the court issuing the warrant makes
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In Florida, however, the legislature has specifically provided for
waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court:
If the court finds, after a waiver hearing, that a child who was 14
years of age or older at the time the alleged violation was commit-
ted and who is alleged to have committed a violation of Florida
law should be charged and tried as an adult, then the court may
enter an order transferring the case and certifying the case for
trial as if the child were an adult. The child shall thereafter be
subject to prosecution, trial, and sentencing as if the child were
an adult but subject to the provisions of [section] 39.111(6).35
A. Due Process Requirements
Decisions interpreting the Florida rule and similar waiver provi-
sions have held that a child subject to waiver must be afforded a
hearing prior to transfer by the juvenile court.3 6 In Kent v. United
States,3 7 Morris Kent, a juvenile, was apprehended and interro-
gated concerning a housebreaking and rape. Without conducting
the "full investigation" required by statute, the juvenile court
judge transferred Kent to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit
court where he was found guilty of housebreaking and was sen-
tenced to a term of thirty to ninety years in prison.38
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that although
a minor has no constitutional right to treatment in a separate
court system, once such a system is authorized by statute a juve-
nile may not be transferred from it until due process requirements
are met.39 Characterizing the waiver process as a "critically impor-
tant" process which determines important statutory rights for the
juvenile, the Court held that due process requires that no transfer
the determination. Id. at 4-2. By comparison, Nebraska has no waiver provision because
juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the more serious offenses. Id.
New York, on the other hand, has a very young jurisdictional age. More significantly, how-
ever, it utilizes a "reverse waiver" process whereby older children charged with serious of-
fenses may sometimes be transferred to the juvenile court. Id. at 4-1 to 4-2.
35. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(a) (1981).
36. Because juvenile court proceedings are characterized as civil rather than criminal in
nature, juveniles are often stripped of due process rights which would have been afforded
adults charged with similar offenses. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545 n.3
(1966); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973); Note, Delinquency and Denied
Rights in Florida's Juvenile Court System, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 369 (1968).
37. 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
38. Id. at 546-48.
39. Id. at 557.
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to a criminal court shall occur without a hearing and a statement
of reasons.40 Citing Pee v. United States,1 the Court explained
that it did not mean that the waiver hearing "must conform with
all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual ad-
ministrative hearing; but, [such a] hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment."' 2
In an appendix to the opinion, the Court announced eight crite-
ria and principles concerning waiver of jurisdiction. The Court
noted that these criteria were consistent with the basic aims and
purposes of the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia.43
The Kent standards have been adopted by a majority of states
both judicially44 and statutorily.4 In 1975, they were incorporated
almost verbatim into the Florida Juvenile Justice Act.4e Under cur-
40. Id. at 556-57.
41. 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
42. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
43. Id. at 565-67.
44. See, e.g., State v. Lemmon, 521 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Ariz. 1974); Mikulovsky v. State,
196 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. 1972).
45. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (West 1979).
46. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c) (1981) provides:
The court shall conduct a hearing... for the purpose of determining whether a
child should be transferred. In making its determination, the court shall consider:
. (1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community is best served by transferring the child for
adult sanctions.
(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner.
(3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal
injury resulted.
(4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint.
(5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the child's associates in the alleged crime are adults or children
who are to be tried as adults who will be or have been charged with a crime.
(6) The sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by con-
sideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and
pattern of living.
(7) The record and previous history of the child, including:
a. Previous contacts with the department, other law enforcement
agencies, and courts;
b. Prior periods of probation or community control;
c. Prior adjudications that the child committed a delinquent act or
violation of law, greater weight being given if the child had previ-
ously been found by a court to have committed a delinquent act in-
volving an offense classified as a felony or had twice previously been
found to have committed a delinquent act involving an offense classi-
fied as a misdemeanor; and
d. Prior commitments to institutions.
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rent Florida law, before a child may be transfered to the adult
court the juvenile court must comply with the guidelines enumer-
ated in Kent. "7
B. State Attorney May Request Waiver
In addition to setting forth the guidelines for judicial waiver, the
Act empowers the Office of the State Attorney to seek transfer of
any child for adult criminal prosecution if the child was fourteen
years of age or older at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense for which he is charged.4 8 Under this provision, the prose-
cutor's decision to request a transfer is discretionary. However, if a
child is currently charged with a violent crime against a person,
and has been previously adjudicated delinquent for a similar of-
fense, the statute allows no such discretion. The state attorney is
mandated to either file a motion requesting the transfer or an in-
formation pursuant to section 39.04(2)(e)(4).e
If the state files a motion for waiver, the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services is required, prior to the hearing on the
motion, to make and submit a written study of the child's back-
ground utilizing the Kent standards. 0 The child, his parents,
guardians, or counsel, and the state attorney, are then authorized
to examine these reports and to question those responsible for
their preparation. 1 Upon completion of the waiver hearing, if the
decision to transfer is made by the court, the judge is required by
law to submit written findings of fact with respect to each of the
Kent criteria." Moreover, the judge must also enter a court order
(8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likeli-
hood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child, if he is found to have com-
mitted the alleged offense, by the use of procedures, services, and facilities
currently available to the court.
47. Id.
48. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(a) (1981).
49. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(a) (1981) mandates that if the child has been "previously adju-
dicated delinquent for a violent crime against a person, to wit Murder, sexual battery,
armed or strong-armed robbery, aggravated battery or aggravated assault," the state attor-
ney must act pursuant to its provisions.
50. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(d) (1981).
51. Id.
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(e) (1981). A state is free to select its own statutory scheme to
govern the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult court. Therefore, the procedural protec-
tions which the child must be afforded before he may be treated as an adult will depend
upon the statute which originally entitled him to juvenile treatment. Stokes v. Fair, 581
F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537-38 (1974).
19841
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specifying the reasons for imposing adult sanctions." If the child is
opposed to waiver, he is free to seek review on appeal pursuant to
section 39.14."
III. TRANSFER BY INFORMATION
Perhaps the procedure which is used most often to transfer a
juvenile to the adult court is that pursuant to an information filed
by the state attorney. Since early common law, it has been well-
settled that prosecution for a crime must be preceded by a formal
accusation. 5 Under both the Juvenile Justice Act56 and the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 57 all proceedings against a child al-
leged to be delinquent shall be initiated by the filing of a petition
by a person authorized by law to do so. Pursuant to a recent legis-
lative amendment, however, an information may be filed against
any child sixteen or seventeen years old who is alleged to have
committed an offense if, in the state attorney's judgment and dis-
cretion, the public interest requires that adult sanctions be consid-
ered." The effect of this provision, like that of judicial waiver, is to
force the child into the adult criminal system. Unlike judicial
waiver, however, no due process hearing is required." The filing of
an information is considered a prerogative of the prosecutor.
Therefore, absent the presence of certain factors, the decision to
charge is not subject to judicial review.60
A child who has been charged with a misdemeanor may never-
53. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(e) (1981).
54. Id.
55. C. TORCIA, 2 WHARTON'S CRMINAL PROCEDURE § 225 (12th ed. 1975).
56. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(1) (1981).
57. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100. A uniform traffic citation may be considered a petition, but is
not subject to the requirements of this rule. Id. See also I.H. v. State, 405 So. 2d 450 (Fla.
1st DCA 1981) (an information initially filed in adult court may substitute for the petition
when the case is transferred to juvenile court).
58. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981). Although the statute provides that the intake of-
ficer may "recommend that the state attorney file a petition of delinquency or an informa-
tion or seek an indictment by the grand jury," this is not "a prerequisite for any action
taken by the state attorney." FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(a) (1981).
59. See, e.g., Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1976) (the court agreed
that Congress could legitimately vest in the Attorney General discretion to proceed against
a minor as a juvenile or an adult and that the exercise of such discretion does not require a
hearing); Register v. Safer, 368 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (a state attorney has discre-
tion to prosecute juveniles under certain conditions by filing an information and is not
bound by the certification provisions which place discretion in the judge and require a de-
termination by the court of the Kent factors).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 94 & 95 for the circumstances under which a
court may review the state attorney's charging decision.
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theless be treated as a juvenile. However, this is so only if he can
show that he has not been previously found to have committed two
delinquent acts, one of which was a felony."' Upon consideration of
this requirement, the Florida Supreme Court in Lott v. State6 has
determined that it does not work a hardship on the juvenile. The
court noted that "under the statute, the juvenile is only required
to submit some form of legally sufficient evidence that he has not
committed the subject acts." 8 Accordingly, the court stated that
"[ain affidavit or testimony. . would be satisfactory."
A minor may exercise his right to be tried as a juvenile at any
time prior to the commencement of his criminal trial.65 In State ex
rel. Ortez v. Brousseau," the defendant was charged by direct in-
formation with attempted sexual battery and burglary. Before the
trial, the juvenile filed a motion to transfer the charges for adjudi-
cation against him as a child.6 The state stipulated that the defen-
dant had not previously been adjudicated guilty of two delinquent
acts, one of which would constitute a felony if committed by an
adult.68 Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the defendant, by
waiting, had waived his right to be tried as a juvenile.69 On appeal,
the Second District Court of Appeal held that since the child had
not committed the requisite prior offenses, he had a mandatory
right to be tried as a juvenile.7 0 Acknowledging that while "[there
is much to be said for placing a time limit upon the right to make a
motion to transfer," the court pointed out that both the statute
and the court rules are silent in this respect.71 Accordingly, once
the defendant moved to transfer his case to the juvenile division
for adjudication, the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction over
his prosecution.
61. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981).
62. 400 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1981).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. State ex rel. Ortez v. Brousseau, 403 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Cf. Carter v.
State, 382 So. 2d 871, 873 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (which held that once a 16-year-old had been
convicted in a criminal trial, it was too late to request a transfer to juvenile court).
66. 403 So. 2d 549, 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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A. Is Section 39.04(2)(e)(4) Constitutional?
In State v. Cain,2 the Florida Supreme Court faced a direct
challenge to the constitutionality of section 39.04(2)(e)(4). Mark
Cain, a minor, was charged by an amended information with two
counts of armed burglary and two counts of grand theft. Contend-
ing that "the statute unconstitutionally delegates to the state at-
torney unbridled discretion to prosecute a juvenile as an adult,"
Cain moved to dismiss the charges. 73 The circuit court granted the
defendant's motion and the State of Florida appealed. 4
On review, the constitutionality of the direct filing provision was
upheld.75 Relying on Johnson v. State 7  and Woodard v. Wain-
wright,7 which upheld the constitutionality of the juvenile indict-
ment provision, the court stated that it saw no distinction between
the state attorney's decision to seek an indictment against a juve-
nile7 8 and the decision to file an information.7 9 "In either case,"
said the court, "the legislature has, by these statutory exceptions
to the juvenile division's general jurisdiction over children, re-
turned to the state attorney his traditional prerogative of deciding
who to criminally charge with what offense." 80
There have been several criticisms of the holding in Cain."1
First, in order to uphold the present waiver statute, the court re-
lied upon prior case law which had sustained the constitutionality
of waiver by grand jury indictment.8 2 Emphasizing the differences
between the Office of the State Attorney and a grand jury, the
court's finding that the prosecutor's power to file an information is
the same as his ability to refer the case to a grand jury has been
characterized as "dubious at best. '8 3 Arguably, this is so because
while the state attorney operates practically restraint-free," a
grand jury's actions are limited in that they are subject to the in-
72. 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980).
73. Id. at 1362.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1368.
76. 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975).
77. 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977).
78. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1364. See infra notes 114-72 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
80. Id. Any difference between an indictment and an information is procedural, not sub-
stantive. Id. See also Hubbard v. State, 411 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
81. See Comment, Prosecutorial Waiver of Juveniles Into Adult Court: The Ends of
Justice . . . Or the End of Justice? State v. Cain, 5 NOVA L.J. 487 (1981).
82. Id. at 488.
83. Id. at 489.
84. Id. at 490.
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ternal policing of the jury members.85 Therefore, to say that there
is no difference between the prosecutor's power to file an informa-
tion and his ability to refer the case to the grand jury "mistakes
the fact that two separate institutions are formally accusing the
juvenile, . . . [as] each arrives at its decision to charge in com-
pletely different ways.""
Apparently having anticipated this argument, the Cain court
countered that there is no absolute right to be treated as a juvenile
delinquent rather than a criminal offender."s Such a right exists
only to the extent provided by the legislature." Rejecting the argu-
ment that the state attorney has "unbridled discretion," the court
concluded that the prosecutor's discretion to charge does have lim-
its. Accordingly, pursuant to section 39.04(2)(e)(4), the state attor-
ney "may successfully charge only a sixteen or seventeen-year-old
and then only if the child has also been previously found to have
committed two delinquent acts, one of which would constitute a
felony if committed by an adult."' 9
Comparing the direct file provision to waiver by grand jury in-
dictment, the Cain court noted that the grand jury indictment re-
quirement does not determine the propriety of prosecuting a juve-
nile as an adult. It merely ensures that there is probable cause for
the charge.9 By enacting these exceptions to the court's otherwise
exclusive jurisdiction, the legislature has simply returned to the
prosecutor his traditional prerogative of deciding what criminal
charges to bring and against whom to bring them.91 The court also
noted that the legislature could reasonably have concluded that,
based on factors "such as age, seriousness of the offense and past
record . . . certain juvenile offenders were not suitable candidates
for the juvenile act's rehabilitative goals.""9 Consequently, the
court acknowledged that the legislature could have had valid rea-
sons to classify the juveniles as persons against whom adult sanc-
tions would be a reasonable alternative. 3
Once the statutory requirements are met, the state attorney's
charging discretion is almost absolute. Although "there may be cir-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 491.
87. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1363.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1364-65.
90. Id. at 1365.
91. Id. at 1364.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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cumstances in which courts would be entitled to review the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion, these circumstances would necessa-
rily include the deliberate presence of such factors as 'race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification.' "1 Absent such factors,
courts have held that "the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, even
when it results in different treatment of codefendants originally
charged in the same case with the same offense, does not violate
due process or equal protection of the law."95
B. Does the Florida Direct File Provision Circumvent Kent?
A final argument against section 39.04(2)(e)(4) is that it is an
attempt by the legislature to circumvent the Supreme Court's com-
mand in Kent v. United States. Opponents argue that although a
neutral and detached magistrate is required to abide by the Kent
standards prior to effectuating judicial waiver, the state attor-
ney-a partisan advocate within the system-may effectively by-
pass these standards with the filing of an information."
In apparent agreement with this position, Judge Skelly Wright,
dissenting in United States v. Bland,9 7 stated that the pertinent
question is how the prosecutor should go about making waiver de-
cisions.98 Judge Wright determined that "the shift in decision mak-
ing responsibility from the court to the prosecutor did not elimi-
nate the need for the procedural rights expounded in Kent.""
Characterizing the majority's holding as a "blatant attempt to
evade the force of the Kent decision,"'100 the dissent concluded that
"the rights expounded in Kent are fundamental and immuta-
ble." 101 Admonishing that "[tlhe transfer of the waiver decision
from the neutral judge to the partisan prosecutor increases rather
than diminishes the need for due process protection of the
child,' 0 2 Judge Wright contended that since the effect of the di-
vestiture is the same in both proceedings, the procedural rights ac-
94. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909
(1972) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 488, 456 (1962)).
95. Bland, 472 F.2d at 1336. See also United States v. Gainey, 440 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
96. See Comment, supra note 81, at 494.
97. 472 F.2d 1329, 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1972).
98. Id. at 1342.
99. Id. at 1342-43.
100. Id. at 1341.
101. Id. at 1341-42.
102. Id. at 1343.
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companying it should also be the same. 0 Thus, he asserted, "we
need look no further than Kent to determine what those rights
are." 
1
Responding to this contention, the Cain court adopted the ra-
tionale set forth in Russell v. Parratt.'e" After reviewing the Kent
decision, the court in Parratt stated that
[i]t is the holding of Kent that when the question is one of waiver
of jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, and it is to be decided by a
judge of the Juvenile Court, the juvenile is entitled to a hearing
on the question of waiver, and to the assistance of counsel in that
hearing.'"
The court noted, however, that the decision to direct file does not
involve judicial proceedings.' 07 Rather, it involves "a traditional
exercise of discretion within the executive branch."' 08 Although
recognizing that the prosecutor's charging decision has a substan-
tial impact on the course of subsequent proceedings, the court re-
fused to equate the prosecutorial decision with judicial proceedings
absent a legislative directive.10" The net result is that without such
factors as race, religion or arbitrary classification, due process in
Florida does not require either a hearing or consideration of the
Kent criteria prior to the direct filing of an information by the
state attorney against a juvenile.
In support of Florida's position, federal courts have also held
that Congress may legitimately vest in the Attorney General dis-
cretion to decide whether to proceed against a juvenile as an
adult. 10 Again, the exercise of such discretion does not require a
due process hearing."' In Bland, the court emphatically rejected
"the hitherto unaccepted argument that due process requires an
adversary hearing before the prosecutor can exercise his age-old
103. Id. at 1344.
104. Id.
105. Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 1216 (footnote omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1216-17.
110. See United States v. Quinones, 516 F.2d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
852 (1975).
111. Id. See also Parratt, 543 F.2d at 1216 n.4, in which the court stated that "[ilt has
not been urged to us that there is any substantial difference in principle between the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion in a proper case by the Attorney General or by a county
attorney, and none has occurred to us."
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function of deciding what charge to bring against whom."' 1 In
light of these decisions, there can be no doubt as to the validity of
Florida's direct file provision.
IV. TRANSFER BY INDICTMENT
Not only has the constitutional validity of the direct filing provi-
sion been upheld, but so too has the constitutionality of the juve-
nile indictment provision. Section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes,
provides that a child of any age charged with a violation of Florida
law punishable by death or by life imprisonment may be trans-
ferred to an adult criminal court when charged by a grand jury
indictment.113 One apparent rationale behind the indictment provi-
sion, like that underlying the direct file provision, is that a child
charged with a serious offense may not be amenable to treatment
as a juvenile and thus he should be treated as an adult. 4
The leading case pertaining to juvenile indictments is Johnson v.
State.110 There, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of section 39.02(5)(c) against a direct attack based on due
process and equal protection grounds.1 6 In Johnson, a juvenile de-
fendant and an adult codefendant were jointly indicted for the
crime of armed breaking and entering with intent to commit a fel-
ony. The first two counts of the indictment each carried a potential
maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 17 Contending that sec-
tion 39.02(5)(c) was unconstitutional, Johnson moved to dismiss
the indictment. The trial court rejected his assertions and upheld
the constitutionality of the statute." 8
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Johnson argued that
the statute violated both the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Florida and the United States Constitutions because
112. Bland, 472 F.2d at 1337.
113. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981) provides that:
A child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by death or
by life imprisonment shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set forth in
s.39.06(7) unless and until an indictment on such charge is returned by the grand
jury. When an indictment is returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, shall be
dismissed.
114. Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088
(1977).
115. 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975).
116. Id. at 577.
117. Id. at 574.
118. Id.
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[s]ome children charged with violations of Florida law punishable
by death or by life imprisonment are indicted and may thereafter
be handled in every respect as an adult, while others similarly
charged are not indicted and are thereby retained within the ju-
risdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court. 11'
Rejecting Johnson's assertions as having "no basis,' 2 0 the court
noted that the constitution permits,'12 1 but does not require, that a
child be charged with an act of delinquency instead of a crime. 22
In addition, the court reasoned that although the juvenile court
has exclusive original jurisdiction in matters involving children, a
valid exception to that court's jurisdiction has been created by the
legislature under section 39.02(5) (c).123 Consequently, the court
found the statute constitutionally valid. 2 4 In so doing, the court
emphasized that in both the adult and juvenile divisions of our
judicial system, the state attorney, as the prosecuting attorney,
may elect to prosecute or not in any particular case. However, this
decision is discretionary and is inherent in our system of criminal
justice.2 8
A. An Indicted Child Shall Be Handled in Every Respect as if
He Were an Adult
Once a grand jury indictment has been returned against the
child, the juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction and "[t]he child
shall be tried and handled in every respect as if he were an
adult.' 26 A waiver or certification hearing comporting with the
Kent guidelines is not required.12 7 Furthermore, "[a] circuit court
119. Id. at 575.
120. Id. at 577.
121. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(b), provides that:
When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be charged with a viola-
tion of law as an act of delinquency instead of crime and tried without a jury or
other requirements applicable to criminal cases. Any child so charged shall, upon
demand made as provided by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried
in an appropriate court as an adult. A child found delinquent shall be disciplined
as provided by law.
122. Johnson, 314 So. 2d at 576.
123. Id. at 576-77.
124. Id. at 577.
125. Id. See also McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (where the court
again rejected the argument that the juvenile indictment provision was unconstitutional be-
cause it allowed for the use of unbridled prosecutorial discretion).
126. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c)(1) (1981). See also State v. N.B., 360 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978); State v. Robinson, 336 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
127. Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785-86 (5th Cir. 1977) (in which the court
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is without authority to treat an indicted juvenile under the protec-
tive provisions of Chapter 39" but must, during pretrial proceed-
ings, treat him "as an adult in every respect including the setting
of terms for bail or release or confinement. '1
28
B. Related Offenses Not Punishable by Death or by Life
Imprisonment May Also Be Charged by Indictment
Under prior Florida law, a child could not be charged by indict-
ment for an offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment.
However, this changed in 1980. In Robidoux v. Coker, 29 Benjamin
Robidoux, a juvenile, was indicted in three separate counts for
armed robbery, attempted murder, and aggravated assault. Only
the armed robbery was punishable by life imprisonment or by
death. 380 This being the case, Robidoux, by petition for writ of pro-
hibition, sought to prevent the adult criminal court from exercising
jurisdiction over the remaining two counts of the indictment. Rea-
soning that only the offense punishable by death or by life impris-
onment was properly before the court, Robidoux argued that ab-
sent a valid waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court on the
charges in question, the criminal court lacked jurisdiction to try
him."'
In granting the defendant's petition, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal stated that while it may have been more expedient to
dispose of all charges in a single judicial proceeding, the fact that
additional charges arose out of the same incident as the life felony
was insufficient to allow adult jurisdiction. 32 Thus, the court held
that "[oinly the offense punishable by death or life imprisonment
is properly before the adult court."3 3 In explaining its holding, the
court admonished that "what could not have been done by the
filing of separate indictments for the three offenses, cannot be
done by the simple expedient of a single indictment."'" However,
Judge Anstead concluded that, assuming the filing of a delin-
rejected the defendant's argument that § 39.02(1), FLA. STAT. (1975) (amended 1980), which
vested exclusive original jurisdiction in the juvenile court over "proceedings in which a child
is alleged to be. . .delinquent," gave him an absolute right to treatment as a juvenile which
could not be divested without a hearing).
128. Florida ex rel Powers v. Schwartz, 355 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
129. 383 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
130. Id. at 720.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 721.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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quency petition, the state would not be precluded from seeking a
waiver hearing on the related offenses. " 5
In arriving at its decision, the court reviewed several related
opinions. In E.H.N. v. Willis,"3 6 a juvenile was charged by two sep-
arate informations, each alleging the commission of two felonies.13 7
At the time these offenses were committed, the juvenile defendant
was serving a sentence based upon a prior felony conviction in the
adult division. The new charges arose from, or were closely con-
nected with, the incarceration arising out of the prior felony con-
viction.3 " The issue in E.H.N. was whether the adult division of
the circuit court had jurisdiction to try the defendant on the four
new felonies absent a waiver of jurisdiction and certification of the
case by the juvenile court.
Ruling that the adult division was without jurisdiction, the First
District Court of Appeal emphatically held that section 39.02(5) (a),
the waiver hearing statute, permits the child to be treated as an
adult only for the purpose of disposing of the alleged violation
pending in the juvenile division.3 9 Where new criminal charges are
involved, the child must again receive a waiver hearing and certifi-
cation to adult court, notwithstanding the fact that the juvenile
division has previously waived jurisdiction as to an earlier criminal
charge."10
A similar result was reached in A.D.T. v. State.'14 There, the ju-
venile defendant was charged by indictment with one count of dis-
orderly intoxication and with three counts of resisting arrest with
violence. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal held that
the state could not use an indictment as a substitute for a petition
alleging delinquency. ' 2 Noting that substitution is permitted only
when the child is charged by grand jury indictment with a viola-
tion of Florida law punishable by death or life imprisonment, the
court reasoned that "had the legislature intended for an indict-
ment to be used in the place of a delinquency petition in any other
situations, it would have so provided.' 4 3
After a review of the pertinent case law and the four exceptions
135. Id. This was before the enactment of section 39.04(2)(e)(4), the direct file provision.
136. 350 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See Robidoux, 383 So. 2d at 719-20.
137. E.H.N., 350 So. 2d at 830.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 318 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). See Robidoux, 383 So. 2d at 721.
142. A.D.T., 318 So. 2d at 480.
143. Id.
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contained in chapter 39, the Robidoux court steadfastly refused to
create a fifth exception. " Although acknowledging that its action
may in practice appear to be superfluous or inefficient, the court
declined to engage in judicial legislation. The problem was left for
the legislature to examine."
5
In a direct response to the Robidoux court's dilemma, the Flor-
ida legislature amended the Juvenile Justice Act.146 Consequently,
after October 1, 1981, when a grand jury returns an indictment
against a juvenile on an offense punishable by death or by life im-
prisonment, the juvenile may be tried as an adult on the indictable
offense and on any other connected or related offense charged in
the indictment." 7  Thus, the Robidoux problem has been
eliminated.
C. An Indictment May Not Substitute for an Information but
the Right Not To Be Charged by Indictment May Be Waived
Approximately one year after Robidoux, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal was again confronted with the question of whether
a juvenile charged with offenses not punishable by death or life
imprisonment had been improperly indicted. In King v. State,"8
Nathaniel King, a juvenile, was indicted for robbery and aggra-
vated battery. Failing to attack the indictment in the trial court,
King was tried as an adult and convicted."' On appeal to the
Fourth District, King asserted for the first time that because he
was a juvenile he could not be charged by indictment and tried as
an adult under the provisions of chapter 39.150
Reversing the defendant's conviction, the appellate court di-
rected the court below to dismiss the indictment without prejudice
in order to allow the state to proceed as required by chapter 39."'
144. Robidoux, 383 So. 2d at 721.
145. Id.
146. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c)(1)(b) (1981).
147. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c)(1) (1981) provides in pertinent part:
The child shall be tried and handled in every respect as if he were an adult:
a. On the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment; and
b. On all other felonies or misdemeanors charged in the indictment which are
based on the same act or transaction as the offense punishable by death or by life
imprisonment or on one or more acts or transactions connected with the offense
punishable by death or by life imprisonment.
148. 425 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Moreover, holding that the indictment was not proper because the
crimes charged were not punishable by death or by life imprison-
ment, the court explained that to rule otherwise would allow the
state attorney to circumvent the provisions of chapter 39 "by seek-
ing an indictment for every alleged juvenile offender."6 2
In concluding, however, the appellate court acknowledged what
it perceived to be a "rather incongruous situation as a result of
[its] decision."' 1 3 Recognizing that section 39.04(2)(e)(4) allows
under certain circumstances the direct filing of an information
against a juvenile sixteen years of age or older, the court stated
that "it does not logically follow that the same juvenile should be
denied the greater degree of protection an indictment provides by
having probable cause established by a grand jury.""" Seeking a
remedy to this problem, the court certified the following question
to the Florida Supreme Court: "May a juvenile who is subject to
the direct filing of an information against him for a crime not pun-
ishable by death or life imprisonment also be subjected to the pre-
sentment of an indictment against him for like crimes?""'
In State v. King,'"6 the Florida Supreme Court answered this
question in the negative, finding "no indication that the legislature
intended to allow the indictment of sixteen- or seventeen-year-old
juveniles as an alternative to the filing of a direct information."
The court reasoned that section 39.04(2)(e)(5) "must be read to-
gether with section 39.02(5)(c), which limits the crimes for which a
juvenile may be indicted. 1 57 The court held that a juvenile has a
right not to be charged by an indictment for an offense not punish-
able by life imprisonment or death. If it is not timely or properly
asserted, however, this right will be waived.' Since the trial court
had jurisdiction over all felonies as well as the parties, the court
held that any objections the defendant may have had as to the
court's jurisdiction over his person were waived when he appeared
in person and defended his case.'"
Justice McDonald, concurring on the issue of waiver, entertained
a different point of view with regard to the indictment. 60 In his
152. Id. at 1380.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 426 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1982).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 15 (McDonald, J., concurring). Justice McDonald concurred in the opinion to
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opinion, an indictment in which the state attorney concurs is the
functional equivalent of an information filed by the prosecutor to
proceed in the adult division of the circuit court.1 ' The state at-
torney is charged with preparing both informations and indict-
ments. Since a proper indictment and an information contain "the
same essential allegations," Justice McDonald concluded that by
enacting section 39.04(2)(e)(4) the legislature contemplated and
authorized prosecution by indictment for offenses not punishable
by death or life imprisonment.16
Even so, although a child may be indicted for the requisite of-
fense, the legislature has imposed restrictions on the time frame in
which the juvenile court may accept a plea or otherwise dispose of
the cause.
D. Preventing the Race to the Courthouse
As a final consideration, the legislature has provided that "[a]n
adjudicatory hearing shall be held within 21 days from the date
that the child is taken into custody and charged" with the requi-
site offense. 63 During this period, the juvenile court may act on
any matter pertaining to the child and his welfare except adjudica-
tion.1' " This provision "prevents the so-called 'race to the court-
house,' where a child charged with a capital or life felony rushes to
an adjudicatory hearing before the Juvenile Court in order to avoid
prosecution as an adult. ' 165 In the event that the court unwittingly
accepts such a plea, its action is void ab initio.166 To rule otherwise
would frustrate the legislative intent1 e by permiting "the juvenile
court to exercise jurisdiction [which is] expressly forbidden with-
out recourse by the state."' 1 8
Conversely, the state attorney may advise the court in writing
that he does not intend to present the case to the grand jury or,
the extent that it addressed the issue of waiver and the propriety of King's conviction.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c)(2) (1981).
164. State v. Lisak, 409 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (stating that State v. Cain,
581 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980) clearly indicates that the juvenile court's jurisdiction is specifi-
cally limited during the 21-day period immediately following the defendant's arrest).
165. State v. Meagher, 323 So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (referring to the predeces-
sor statute which provided for a 14-day period during which the juvenile court was prohib-
ited from taking any action).
166. Lisak, 409 So. 2d at 1151.
167. Id. at 1151-52.
168. Id. at 1151.
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having had the case presented to it, the grand jury may return a no
true bill. In these circumstances, the court may then proceed as
otherwise authorized by chapter 39. " In addition, if the grand
jury fails to act within the specified period, the court is again free
to proceed under chapter 39.1 However, the grand jury is not pre-
vented from thereafter indicting the child and divesting the court
of its jurisdiction.""
V. TRANSFER ON DEMAND BY THE CHILD
Perhaps the least contested and the least used provision for
transferring a juvenile to the adult criminal court is the demand-
waiver provision. Section 39.02(5)(b), Florida Statutes, provides
that upon written demand of the child and his parent or guardian
the juvenile court shall transfer and certify the case for trial as if
the child were an adult.172 Resort to this provision may be appro-
priate when the sanctions to be imposed by the juvenile court are
more severe than those available to the adult court for a similar
offense.17 3
Holding that transfer under this section is mandatory, the court
in State v. Williams17 4 granted the defendant's writ to prohibit the
juvenile court from exercising jurisdiction. The defendant was a
minor charged with careless driving. Pursuant to Rule 8.100(b),
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Williams made a timely de-
mand for waiver of jurisdiction and certification for trial as an
adult.17  The juvenile court denied the motion and held that
waiver is not mandatory, but is subject to the discretion of the ju-
venile court judge.' 6
169. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c)(2) (1981).
170. Id.
171. Woods v. State, 323 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (referring to FLA. STAT. §
39.02(5)(c) (1975)).
172. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(b) (1981) provides that:
The court shall transfer and certify the case for trial as if the child were an adult
if the child is alleged to have committed a violation of law and, prior to the com-
mencement of an adjudicatory hearing, the child, joined by a parent or, in the
absence of a parent, by his guardian or guardian ad litem, demands in writing to
be tried as an adult.
See also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.150(a).
173. An example of this is a child who receives a traffic citation for a noncriminal of-
fense. He may be subject to only a fine in the traffic court whereas the same offense may
subject him to detention or community control in the juvenile system.
174. 304 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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On review, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed. The
court noted that section 22 of the Declaration of Rights177 provides
that the right to trial by jury "shall be secure to all and remain
inviolate,' ' 178 and that section 15(b) of the Declaration provides
that "[any] child . . . charged with a violation of law as an act of
delinquency instead of crime and tried without a jury . . . shall,
upon demand as provided by law,. .. be tried in an appropriate
court as an adult. 1 7' 9 The court concluded that these are two fun-
damentals which control the interpretation of Rule 8.100(b). Ac-
cordingly, the Second District Court of Appeal held that when a
child demands waiver, the juvenile court must transfer the case. 80
Transfer under the demand-waiver provision does not mean,
however, that a child relinquishes his right to juvenile treatment
for all future violations of law.181 In fact, the statute specifically
provides that only a child who has been transferred pursuant to a
waiver hearing or information and subsequently found guilty of the
offense charged shall be handled for any subsequent prosecution as
if he were an adult.18 2
In F.S.N. v. Joyce, 88 a seventeen-year-old juvenile, initially
charged by petition with petit theft, sought and was granted trans-
fer to the adult division pursuant to section 39.02(5)(b). He was
subsequently found guilty and placed on probation. A short time
later, Joyce was again arrested on an unrelated charge. He then
moved to transfer his case to the custody of juvenile authorities.
Based on its interpretation of section 39.02(5)(d), Florida Statutes,
and its finding that the defendant, "by voluntarily submitting him-
self to the adult division of the county court on the previous petit
theft charge, had relinquished his right to be treated as a juvenile
for further violations of Florida law," the trial court denied the
motion. 8 "4
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. Order-
ing that the child be discharged and transferred to the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the court noted that the leg-
islature has not provided that any transfer would allow for a juve-
177. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
178. Williams, 304 So. 2d at 473 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. F.S.N. v. Joyce, 384 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
182. Id. at 721 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(d) (1979)).
183. 384 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
184. Id.
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nile to be treated as an adult in subsequent prosecutions. Instead,
the legislature has specifically enumerated the methods of transfer
which would authorize a juvenile to be subsequently treated as an
adult.18 Stating that the legislature intended to limit the treat-
ment of children as adults for subsequent violations to those situa-
tions in which an independent determination that the child should
be treated as an adult has been made by the prosecutor, the grand
jury or the court, the Joyce court held that a transfer on demand
does not involve such an independent determination.'86 Rather, it
is merely a transfer voluntarily obtained by the juvenile. As such,
it does not prevent the child from receiving future treatment as a
juvenile pursuant to chapter 39.187 However, in the event that the
juvenile is transferred and subsequently adjudicated as guilty, the
question arises as to what sentencing alternatives are available to
the adult court.
VI. SENTENCING THE TRANSFERRED OFFENDER
A child who has been transferred to adult court and found guilty
of the alleged offense may nonetheless be sentenced by the adult
court as a juvenile pursuant to chapter 39.188 The Florida Legisla-
ture, by enactment of section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes, has man-
dated the procedure which the court must follow to dispose of the
child's case.
Prior to imposing judgment, the trial court must first conduct a
disposition hearing to determine whether juvenile or adult sanc-
tions are appropriate. 189 In making this determination the court
must weigh the enumerated criteria pertaining to the seriousness
of the offense, the sophistication and maturity of the child, the
child's prior record, if any, and the prospects for adequate protec-
tion of the public and reasonable rehabilitation of the child. These
criteria are almost identical to the Kent standards required for ju-
185. Id. at 721.
186. Id.
187. Id. In a special concurrence, Chief Judge Letts agreed that "the applicable statutes
do not appear to cover voluntary transfers." It was his opinion, however, that it is probably
"a legislative oversight rather than anything else." Moreover, he noted that since "section
39.02(5)(d) appears by its language to be contemplating only felonies," there was no harm
done to the result in Joyce since the initial crime in that case was only a misdemeanor. Id.
at 722 (Letts, C.J., specially concurring).
188. Evans, Juvenile Justice: The Legislature Revisits Chapter 39, 55 FLA. B.J. 697, 699
(1981).
189. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6)(c) (1981).
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dicial waiver.190 Failure to consider these standards may result in
reversal of the court's decision on appeal.""1
If it is determined that juvenile sanctions are appropriate, the
court has at its disposal a variety of sentencing alternatives. The
court may, in its discretion, commit the child to the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services to receive treatment in a youth-
ful offender program outside of the correctional system, place the
child in a community control program, or classify the child as a
youthful offender." 2
If the child is placed in a community control program, the court
may also impose various community-based sanctions.9 3 Included
among the court's options are rehabilitative restitution, curfew,
revocation or suspension of a driver's license, community or public
service, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, and any
other restraints which the court may deem appropriate to place on
the child's liberty.'"
In the alternative, the court may choose to classify the juvenile
as a youthful offender pursuant to chapter 958, Florida Statutes,
190. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6)(c) provides that:
Suitability or nonsuitability for adult sanctions shall be determined by the court
before any other determination of disposition. The suitability determination shall
be made by reference to the following criteria:
1. The seriousness of the offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires adult disposition.
2. Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated,
or willful manner.
3. Whether the offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by considera-
tion of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of
living.
5. The record and previous history of the child, including:
a. Previous contacts with the department, the Department of Correc-
tions, other law enforcement agencies, and courts,
b. Prior periods of probation or community control,
c. Prior adjudications that the child committed a violation of law, and
d. Prior commitments to institutions.
6. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the child if he is assigned to juvenile services and
facilities.
191. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 386 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Stallins v. State,
385 So. 2d 1171, 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Proctor v. State, 373 So..2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979). But see Glenn v. State, 411 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (failure to object at trial
level to trial court's failure to strictly comply with statutory procedures results in waiver on
appeal).
192. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(1) (1981).
193. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6)(e) (1981).
194. Id.
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the Florida Youthful Offender Act.1"5 Under this chapter, any per-
son who is at least eighteen years old, or who has been transferred
for prosecution to the criminal division pursuant to chapter 39,
may be classified as a youthful offender. No person, however, who
has been found guilty of a capital or life felony is eligible to receive
this classification.'" Although an indicted juvenile is considered
"transferred . . pursuant to chapter 39" if he is convicted of the
primary offense, section 958.04(1)(c) effectively denies him the
more protective treatment afforded to less serious offenders.'"
Moreover, this limitation also applies to those offenders who have
been transferred pursuant to judicial waiver or information.
Finally, if the court determines that juvenile sanctions are inap-
propriate, the transferred juvenile may then be exposed to adult
sanctions. 19s Depending upon the nature and the seriousness of the
offense, the statutory minimum sentencing provisions may also
come into play.1 99 If the defendant used a firearm or weapon in the
commission of a felony, the penalty for the offense is enhanced.'"
Any decision to impose adult sanctions, however, must be in writ-
ing.201 The sentencing court must, in its record, render findings of
fact and reasons for its decision which conform to the specified cri-
teria.2 02 The court's order is then subject to review on appeal by
the child, pursuant to section 39.14.201
195. FLA. STAT. §§ 958.011-.15 (1981). See also State v. Goodson, 403 So. 2d 1337 (Fla.
1981).
196. FLA. STAT. § 958.04 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The court may classify as a youthful offender any person:
(a) Who is at least 18 years of age or who has been transferred for pros-
ecution to the criminal division of the circuit court pursuant to chapter 39;
(c) Who has not previously been classified as a youthful offender under
the provisions of this act; however, no person who has been found guilty of
a capital or life felony may be classified as a youthful offender under this
act.
197. Goodson, 403 So. 2d at 1337; see also Judge v. State, 408 So. 2d 831, 832 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982); Williams v. State, 406 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
198. See FLA. STAT. § 775.081 (1981) (classifications of felonies and misdemeanors); FLA.
STAT. § 775.082 (1981) (penalties).
199. Ringel v. State, 366 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1978).
200. FLA. STAT. § 775.087 (1981). However, this provision does not apply to an offense in
which the use of a firearm is an essential element.
201. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6)(d) (1981).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
There is a common thread running through the procedures by
which a child may be transferred for adult treatment. In each case,
the transfer is accomplished by the stroke of a pen. The significant
difference, however, lies in the figure wielding the pen. Under the
judicial waiver provision, the determination to transfer is made by
the juvenile court judge. His hand signs the order certifying the
child to the adult court's jurisdiction.
In Florida, the judge's discretion to certify is limited by
mandatory consideration of the Kent factors. The United States
Supreme Court has held that certain due process requirements
must be met before a child can be transferred by waiver to adult
court. The Florida Legislature has incorporated the Kent factors
into the Juvenile Justice Act almost verbatim. It is only after con-
sidering these factors and determining that the public interest is
best served by transferring the child that the juvenile judge is au-
thorized to sign a waiver order.
Unlike the waiver provision, however, transfer by information
requires no due process hearing. The key figure holding the pen in
this instance is the state attorney. Pursuant to a recent legislative
amendment, the prosecution has been given a tremendous amount
of power. Under the Act, he is authorized to file an information
against any child aged sixteen or seventeen years who has previ-
ously been found guilty of the requisite offenses. In this way, the
juvenile court system is bypassed completely.
Courts which have considered the direct file provision have up-
held it as a valid exercise of legislative authority. Moreover, the
state attorney's decision to charge or not to charge a juvenile by
information-even when it results in disparate treatment of code-
fendants-is viewed as an act of prosecutorial discretion and, as
such, is virtually absolute. Even if the state attorney is barred from
filing an information against the child because the child fails to
meet the age or prior adjudication of guilt requirements, he may
nevertheless succeed in obtaining a transfer if the child is charged
with an indictable offense.
Under the juvenile indictment provision the grand jury sits in
the place of the juvenile court judge. The determination of proba-
ble cause to charge the child with a criminal offense is made by the
grand jury. However, as in the case of an information, due process
considerations are not required.
If the prosecutor succeeds in obtaining from the grand jury a
true bill of indictment, he has again effected a transfer. For, al-
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though the grand jury signs the indictment, it does so after hearing
the case presented to it by the state prosecutor.
The final method by which a juvenile may be transferred to an
adult court is pursuant to the child's own motion. However, this
involves different considerations. In these circumstances, the
judge, grand jury and state prosecutor play no part. It is the child
and his parents or guardian who are responsible for transferring
the case. Even so, despite the child's treatment as an adult under
this provision, he may still receive juvenile treatment for a subse-
quent offense. According to case law, before a child can be treated
as an adult for any subsequent offense, due process requires that
the initial transfer to an adult court be made only after an inde-
pendent determination by a judge, prosecutor, or grand jury that
the transfer is in the best interests of the public. Where the child
has been transferred to the adult court upon his own motion for
his first offense, no independent determination has been made.
Thus, for any subsequent offense, absent this independent deter-
mination, the child still has the right to be prosecuted in the juve-
nile court system.
At this stage, the question may arise as to whether Florida's
transfer provisions are in keeping with the rehabilitative purposes
of the Juvenile Justice Act. By authorizing these transfer proce-
dures, the legislature has significantly curtailed the juvenile court's
exclusive original jurisdiction. Except for the judicial waiver provi-
sion, the decision to transfer a child to the adult criminal court is
not within the juvenile court's power.
However, a safety feature has been provided. In the event that a
transferred juvenile is subsequently found guilty, the adult court
judge must look to the Act in determining whether juvenile or
adult sanctions are appropriate. If the court determines that juve-
nile sanctions are required, then the protective functions of the ju-
venile court continue to be realized. Likewise, if the sentencing
court determines that adult sanctions are appropriate, the defen-
dant may still receive a degree of protection by being sentenced as
a youthful offender under the Youthful Offender Act. It is only
when the court deals with the more hardened juvenile offender
who is charged with a violent or otherwise heinous crime that the
judge is likely to impose adult sanctions.
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